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Abstract 
The institutional arrangements for 
the promotion of peace, truth, justice, 
reparation and reconciliation of 
countries that are rebuilding demo- 
cratic institutions following long 
years of war and conflict, are complex 
and should necessarily be varied. 
This article will focus on one salutary 
global development, namely the 
adoption of the Rome Statute for the 
establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. The author argues 
that it is essential that states display 
courage, tenacity and strong political 
will in actively pursuing the path of 
international justice and realizing 
the project of making the court a real- 
ity. The article highlights the con- 
tribution that civil society 
organizations including non-gov- 
ernrnental Organizations, women's 
rights groups, academics, journal- 
ists, church groups and legal experts 
can play in educating their fellow 
citizens and in encouraging states to 
ratify the Rome Statute. This article 
approaches the International Crimi- 
nal Court from three vantage points: 
First, the opening up of international 
law to a diversity of actors in the field 
of human rights; second, the univer- 
sality of human rights and third, the 
emerging alliance between some 
States and civil society actors in end- 
ing the cycle of impunity. 
Iris Almeida is the Director of Programmes of 
the International Centre for Human Rights 
and Democratic Development, a Canadian 
organization with an international mandate. 
It works with people and governments in 
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Iris Almeida 
Les dispositions institutionnelles 
pour la promotion de la paix, de la 
vCrit6, de la justice, de la reconstruc- 
tion et de la r6conciliation de pays qui 
cherchent h reconstituer leurs insti- 
tutions dbmocratiques aprss de 
longues annks de guerre et de conflit, 
sont complexes et ne peuvent qu'stre 
fluctuantes. Le present article 
concentre son attention sur un 
element salutaire du dkveloppement 
global, nommement l'adoption des 
Statuts de Rome pour la mise en place 
d'une Cour Criminelle Intern- 
ationale. L'auteur presente une argu- 
mentation selon laquelle il est crucial 
que les etats fassent preuve de cour- 
age, de tCnacit6, et d'une ferme 
volontk politique dans la poursuite 
active du projet d'une Cour 
Internationale de Justice, et vers la 
realisation effective de ce projet. 
L'article met en relief le r61e que les 
organisations issues de la societk civ- 
ile, notamment les organismes non- 
gouvernementaux, les groupes de 
defense des droits des femmes, les 
universitaires, les journalistes, les 
communaut6 religieuses, les juristes, 
peuvent jouer dans Yeducation de 
leurs concitoyens et dans la promo- 
tion d'une ratification par les etats 
des Statuts de Rome. L'article decrit 
les trois principaux atouts d'une 
Cour Criminelle Internationale. 
D'abord, l'ouverture des lois 
internationales h une diversite 
d'acteurs dans le champ des droits 
humains; ensuite, l'universalisation 
des droits humains, et finalement 
l'emergence d'une alliance entre 
certains etats et certains acteurs issus 
de la societe civile dans l'inter- 
ruption du cycle de l'impunitk. 
Introduction 
War breeds atrocities. From the ear- 
liest conflicts of recorded history to 
the global struggles of modem times, 
inhumanities, lust and pillage have 
been the inevitable by-products of 
man's resort to force and arms. Un- 
fortunately, such despicable acts 
have a dangerous tendency to call 
forth primitive impulses of venge- 
ance and retaliation among victim- 
ized peoples. Thesatisfactionof such 
impulses in turn breeds resentment 
and fresh tension. Thus does the spi- 
ral of cruelty and hatred grow. If we 
are ever to develop an orderly inter- 
national community based upon a 
recognition of human dignity, it is of 
the utmost imvortance that the nec- 
essary punishment of those guilty of 
atrocities be as free as possible from 
the ugly stigma of revenge and vin- 
dictiveness. Justice must be tem- 
pered by compassion rather than 
vengeance. We must insist that the 
highest standards of justice be ap- 
plied. Justice Murphy, J., dissenting 
opinion. Trial of General Yamashita, 
327 U.S. 1 (1946) 29. 
The Twentieth Century is the blood- 
iest period inthe history of humankind. 
Armed conflicts have killed and 
maimed millions of people in this cen- 
tury. The United Nations and intema- 
tional relations were dominated by 
super power rivalry and the defence of 
their respective hegemonic interests. 
These blocks and alliances were built 
strictly within the realm of States and 
did not include civil society representa- 
tives. The perpetrators of heinous 
crimes were often sheltered from pros- 
ecution as long as offending regime re- 
mained in power. While the rule of law 
was flouted and the independence of 
judiciary was seriously compromised, 
the international community remained 
silent. 
Today, while international conflicts 
have ebbed, intrastate conflicts are on 
the rise.' Not only do these wars and 
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conflicts continue to result in massive 
destruction of property but what ismost 
despicable is that the overwhelming 
majority of the casualties suffered are 
civilians caught in the crossfire of the 
warring factions or used as "human 
shields." These civilians are not acci- 
dental casualties, but the primary tar- 
gets of attacks; the "laws of war" are 
violated not by accident but by design 
and too often as amatter of policy. While 
the weapons deployed in present day 
conflicts are primarily conventional ar- 
maments, the consequences of the war 
machine are manifest through indis- 
criminate killings, torture, rape and 
maiming of innocent civilians. During 
World War 11, the percentage of civilian 
casualties was 5% and has increased to 
80% in the 1 9 9 0 ~ . ~  
The near instantaneous global me- 
dia coverage highlights in graphic de- 
tail stunning images to a world 
audience, the human cost of some of 
these conflicts. It brings home the risks 
and the challenges accompanying the 
choices of interventions employed by 
UN member States. Experience has 
shown that the strategies adopted by 
the international community in re- 
sponse to such crises and the resources 
committed to deal with them post facto 
are too little and too late t~beeffective.~ 
However, the previous acquiescence 
of States tomassive violations of human 
rights is slowly breaking down in many 
parts of the world. The awareness of the 
public that the culture of impunitf sti- 
fles transitions to democracy is grow- 
ing. In the face of the egregious atrocities 
committed in former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, international public opinion, 
in part, exerted pressure on the United 
Nations Security Council to act. The 
sympathy expressed by the public for 
the victims of "ethnic cleansing" and 
"genocide", their outrage at the actions 
of the violators of human rights and the 
mobilisation of public pressure on gov- 
ernments played a part in the decisions 
of the United Nations Security Council 
in setting up the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the case of Yugoslavia5 
and Rwanda6. Despite their numerous 
constraints, these tribunals through 
their arduous work have put the spot- 
light on serious violations of human 
rights and have increased international 
awareness on the problem of impunity. 
If the enforcement of international 
justice is to be effective and sustainable, 
we would need to adequately address 
three interconnected issues: 1) the right 
of the victims and the rest of society to 
know the facts; 2) the right to a fair, in- 
dependent and impartial prosecution; 
and 3) the right of the victims to repara- 
tion for the crimes committed. The 
search for truth, through the investiga- 
tion and dissemination of facts, and re- 
dress to victims through compensation, 
reparation, rehabilitation and eventu- 
ally reconciliation are often subject to 
the vagaries of "realpolitik". An in- 
creasing number of civil society organi- 
sations hold the view that the 
prosecution of alleged criminals re- 
sponsible for heinous crimes is only one 
part of aneffective plan of action tocom- 
bat impunity. Michael Reisman so elo- 
quently said: 
Courts are indispensable institutions 
in many domestic criminal and civil 
systems, and any polity, no matter 
how structured, must install arrange- 
ments, or varying degrees of institu- 
tionalisation, to apply the law to 
concrete cases. But lest we fall victim 
to a judicial romanticism in which we 
imagine that merely by creating en- 
tities we call (< courts * we have 
solved or prevented major prob- 
lems, we should review the funda- 
mental goals that institutions 
designed to protect our public order 
seek to fulfil.' 
A question often raised is whether 
prosecutions, by encouraging vengeful- 
ness and inviting a backlash from 
threatened combatants, can have the 
effect of unravelling the fragile peace 
typical of countries emerging from long 
and bloody civil ~ t r i f e .~  Many human 
rights defenders and a growingnumber 
of States, in our view, now believe that 
peace is not inimical to justice. They are 
the two sides of the same coin. In this 
line of reasoning it is better for retribu- 
tion to be meted outby acourt with due 
process, rather than an indiscriminate 
continuation of violence and impunity. 
Plato notes that trials can act as acathar- 
sis for previous wrongs and have the 
value of deterren~e.~ Prosecutions also 
signal the end of past atrocities and 
enhance the faith of citizens in human 
rights. As Richard Goldstone, the 
former Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, 
said, "I have absolutely no doubt that if 
there was proper enforcement of hu- 
manitarian law, the level of atrocities 
committed in war would substantially 
decrease."'O 
Currently, efforts in the internation- 
alization of the struggle for human 
rights are spearheadedby the concerted 
work of civil society organizations in- 
cluding women's rights activists, aca- 
demics, national and international 
non-governmental organizations the 
world over. These organizations, na- 
tionally and internationally, are de- 
vising innovative strategies for 
cooperation and partnership with 
those States interested in and commit- 
ted to enforcing international norms 
and standards, building democratic in- 
stitutions, fostering democraticpartici- 
pation and accountability. They have 
grown in strength and numbers since 
the Vienna World Conference on Hu- 
man Rights in 1993," the Fourth Con- 
ference on Women in Beijing in 199512 
and the United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries for the 
Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court in 1998.13 
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The situation in many countries is a 
glaring reminder that States have failed 
to match their rhetoric with action to 
promote human rights. The challenge is 
to put into place effective accountability 
measures in order to translate the 
myriad of international covenants, dec- 
larations, treaties, resolutions and court 
decisions into effective rights at the na- 
tional level, for citizens, victims and the 
whole of society. Effective action 
against impunity must start at the na- 
tional level. However, where the na- 
tional accountability mechanisms are 
too weak or compromised to provide 
justice to the victims, the international 
communityhas a responsibility to step 
in. A growing number of individuals, 
non-governmental organizations and 
States have begun to recognize that the 
principles of sovereignty and non-in- 
terference intheinternal affairs of a state 
should not excuse massive and system- 
atic violations of human rights. In fact 
thestate's duty to protect human rights 
extends not only to its own citizens, but 
also to the international community as 
a whole.14 
This article will focus on one salutary 
development, the adoption of the Rome 
Statute for theestablishment of the Inter- 
national Criminal Court [hereinafter the 
Court]. Part I willexamine the efforts to 
set up a Standing International Crimi- 
nal Court. We will put forward the mo- 
saic of views and actors that formed the 
canvas of the negotiations inRome. Part 
I1 will appraise key issues addressed in 
the Rome Statute, drawing, where ap- 
propriate, from past jurisprudence. It 
will focus, in particular, on comp- 
lementarity with domestic jurisdictions 
and the innovative treatment of gender- 
related crimes. Lastly, Part I11 will con- 
sider the next steps towards the 
establishment of the Court: the work of 
the Preparatory Commission, the fi- 
nancing of the Court and, most irnpor- 
tantly, the ratification of the Rome 
Statute. 
This article will approach the Court 
from three vantage points. First, the 
opening up of international law to a 
diversity of actors in the field of human 
rights, second, the universality of hu- 
man rights and third, the emerging alli- 
ance between some States and civil soci- 
ety actors in ending the cycle of impu- 
nity. 
Traditional international law pur- 
ported only to govern relations between 
nation-states. It regarded individuals 
and non-state groups as objects rather 
than subjects of international law.15 
International law, because of its primi- 
tive nature did not have specialized or- 
gans to create or to apply norms.16 This 
decentralized mechanism allowed hu- 
man rights instruments to be dealt with 
in cosy fora where States criticized each 
other and where the Cold War geo-stra- 
tegic interests put aside the criticisms of 
civil society organizations. The analy- 
sis of positivists fails to appreciate the 
reality of those who suffer the scourge of 
human rights violations. Kelsen notes 
"it does not matter if law (domestic or 
international) is applied or not. Violated 
or not, the law is the law."17 In the 
19901s, however, non-state actors, from 
the North and South, have had better 
access to the UN system. This allows 
human rights defenders to operate on a 
diverse range of terrains, from the local 
to the global system.18 
These efforts have been challenged 
by some recalcitrant States who refuse 
to acknowledge the universal nature of 
human rights and argue that it is a prod- 
uct of Westernculture. However as Preis 
notes, this cultural relativist position is 
premised on an outdated concept of 
culture as integrated, holistic and static, 
rather than on the understanding devel- 
oped within anthropology that culture 
is fragmentary, contested and shift- 
ing.19 No society is based on such sub- 
mission to the authorities so as to accept 
that innocent civilians can be slaugh- 
tered at the whim of the leadership. The 
struggle against impunity for serious 
violations of human rights clearly 
draws upon universal principles of 
human rights and human dignity. 
The third issue is the developing alli- 
ance of the human rights movement and 
some States in breaking the cycle of im- 
punity. This movement is imposing on 
States in a non-voluntarist manner the 
importance of according the highest 
value to jus cogens crimes. Thesecrimes 
refer not only to conventional written 
internationalla~,2~ but also to customs 
and general principles of unwritten in- 
ternational law.21 The legal basis of jus 
cogens crimes consists of international 
pronouncements, or what canbe called 
international opinio juris, reflecting the 
recognition that these crimes are 
deemed part of generril customary 
law." 
Part I - Tenacious Efforts to 
Create an International 
Criminal Court 
Cynics have for many years labelled the 
Court a pipe dream. They have cited the 
difficulty of apprehending violators of 
human rights and the concerns ex- 
pressed by some States on safeguarding 
national sovereignty and defending 
their national security interests. While 
some of these concerns may be legiti- 
mate, they need to be balanced with a 
universal system of enforcing interna- 
tional justice. Moreover, the idea and 
the efforts to establish an International 
Tribunal are not new. The Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocidez3 adopted on 
December 9th 1948 envisioned the crea- 
tion of an international criminal court. 
The International Law Commission 
(ILC) prepared a draft treaty but this 
effort was put on hold once the Cold 
War set in. 
The road to Rome was a long one. The 
United Nations General Assembly, in 
1989, requested the ILC to address the 
question of establishing an interna- 
tional criminal court and in December 
1996, established a Preparatory Com- 
mittee that prepared a draft text for a 
Court. The Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries was organized in 
Rome from June 15~" to July 1998 
with the objective of negotiating astat- 
ute to establish an International Crimi- 
nal Court. Interestingly, drug 
trafficking, the initial impetus for the 
Court, was left off the agenda in favour 
of more serious and pressing issues 
such as genocide, crimes against hu- 
manity and war crimes. 
Delegations representing 160 coun- 
tries, 14 United Nations agencies, 17 
inter-governmental organizations and 
124 non-governmental organizations 
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(NGOs) took part in the Diplomatic 
Conference. Over 700 other NGOs coor- 
dinated their advocacy efforts under the 
umbrella of the Coalition for anhterna- 
tional Criminal Court (CICC) and lob- 
bied States from their respective 
capitals for several months prior to and 
during the Conference. The 'consoli- 
dated' draft Statute contained 1300 
bracketed texts with several options to 
choose from, reflecting the divergence of 
views on some crucial aspects of the 
The non-governmental organi- 
zations (NGOs) present did not sit on 
the sidelines. They enjoyed full access to 
the Committee of the Whole and the 
Working Groups and carried out inten- 
sive lobbying and advocacy efforts. 
Many States included NGOs as advis- 
ers or members on their official delega- 
tions and some government delegations 
took the initiative to meet with NGOs in 
order to set out and justify their govern- 
ment's stand on key issues. Civil society 
advocates participated in the six Pre- 
paratory Committees between 1996 and 
1998~~ and due to their concerted action 
were extremely effective during the 
Rome Conference. The commitment, 
synergy, effective use of electronic com- 
munications, and the flexible strategy to 
encourage and pressure States at differ- 
ent moments during the Rome Confer- 
ence produced positive results. 
The French were insistent on the 
need for tempering the role of the Pros- 
ecutor and tomaintain a high threshold 
on war crimes. The United States del- 
egation, facing intensive opposition to 
the Court from the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee, was concerned that its 
peace-keepers wouldbe subjected topo- 
litically motivated prosecutions from a 
potentialbad faith or overzealous pros- 
ecutor. The US delegation wanted to 
ensure that the Court would be under 
the control of the Security Council, a 
position shared by the other permanent 
members of the Security Council. 
In Rome, a group of "like-minded" 
States such as Canada, Australia, Ar- 
gentina, Chile, Denmark, Sweden, Sen- 
egal, South Africa, Singapore and South 
Korea, joined by approximately fifty 
others, played a constructive role in the 
negotiations towards a final Rome Stat- 
ute. This group included many enthusi- 
astic Sub-Saharan African States who 
made a valuable contribution in ensur- 
ing that the Rome Statute reflected not 
just a court for the poorer underdevel- 
oped countries but also one for the 
world. NGOs met with the like-minded 
and exerted pressure on them to demon- 
strate leadership and to use their 
strength of numbers in the negotiation 
of fundamental issues on the agenda. 
Agreeing on a Statute that would 
ensure a strong, independent, effective 
and permanent Court was anextraordi- 
nary challenge. However, the momen- 
tum generated by the Preparatory 
Committee, able leadership by the 
Chairpersons, the precedents of the 
Nuremberg, Tokyo, the Hague and 
Arusha Tribunals and the focus pro- 
vided by the five weeks of intense politi- 
cal and legal efforts in Rome by the 
NGOs and the like-minded States 
helped bring this difficult process to 
fruition. Of the 148 States present and 
voting, 120 States voted in favour of es- 
tablishing the Court, 7 States voted 
against and 21 States abstained. 
The adoption of this Treaty marks a 
historical moment and is one more step 
in the international community efforts 
to end impunity for egregious crimes. 
Unlike the International Court of Jus- 
ticeF6 whose jurisdiction is restricted to 
States, the Court will have jurisdiction 
over 'natural persons' irrespective of 
whether they are political leaders, ordi- 
nary citizens or members of the armed 
forces.27 Unlike the Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, whose 
jurisdictions are chronologically or geo- 
graphically limited, the Court will be 
permanent and, subject to extensive rati- 
fication, has the potential for global 
reach. 
Part I1 - An Appraisal of the 
Fundamental Challenges 
Addressed 
In order to gain universal acceptance, 
the Court will focus on crimes of the 
"most serious concern to the interna- 
tional community as a wholew2* : Geno- 
cide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes and, when a definition has been 
agreed upon, aggression. Furthermore, 
some treaty crimes found their way into 
the Rome Statute, albeit in a modified 
form, such as Crime of Apartheid under 
Crimes against Humanity. 
The Rome Statute does not permit 
any  reservation^.^^ The Lawyers Com- 
mittee for Human Rights, Amnesty In- 
ternational, The International Centre 
for Human Rights and Democratic De- 
velopment, Human Rights Watch and 
numerous national and international 
NGOs advocated against reservations. 
Human Rights Watch stressed that 
"permitting reservations would under- 
mine the force and moral authority be- 
hind aTreaty and weaken thenature of 
the obligations embodied in it.30 
We will discuss four fundamental 
issues addressed at the Conference: the 
definition of crimes, the jurisdiction of 
the Court, its complementarity with 
national courts and the inclusion of 
gender sensitive provisions in the Rome 
Statute. 
1. Defining the Crimes Covered- 
1.1 Crime of Genocide: "The 
Crime of all Crimes." 
In article 6 of the Rome Statute, the Crime 
of Genocide is defined in a manner iden- 
tical to article I1 of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of G e n ~ c i d e . ~ ~  The Crime of 
Genocide is defined as: 
Any of the following acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such; 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction 
in whole and in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to 
prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of 
the group to another group. 
The judgement by the Tribunal for 
Rwanda in Prosecutor v. Aka- 
y e ~ u , ~ ~ a n d   few judgements by na- 
tional courts as in A.G. Israel v. 
E i ~ h m a n n , ~ ~  and Minister of Citizen- 
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ship and Immigration (Canada) v. 
MugeseraX provide judicial interpre- 
tation. First, "killing members of a 
group" does not refer to involuntary 
homicide or unpremeditated killing. An 
offender must intend to destroy in 
whole or in part, a protected group. Sec- 
ond, the Rwanda Tribunal noted that 
the harm need not be permanent and 
irremediable and included rape and 
other forms of sexual violence in this 
provision. Third, "inflicting conditions 
of life" may include acts relating to "sub- 
jecting a group of people to a subsist- 
ence diet, systematic expulsion from 
their homes and the reduction of essen- 
tial medical services below the mini- 
mumreq~irement."~~ 
Fourthly, "imposing measures to 
prevent births" is clarified in the Geno- 
cide Convention, and by the A.G Israel 
v Eichmann j~dgement?~ assuch meas- 
ures that could include sterilization, 
compulsory abortion, segregation of the 
sexes and obstacles t~mar r i age .~~  In the 
Akayesu case, the Tribunal for Rwanda 
went further, stating: "In patriarchal 
societies, where membership of a group 
is determined by the identity of the fa- 
ther, an example of a measure intended 
to prevent births within a group is the 
case where during rape, a woman of the 
said group is deliberately impregnated 
by a man of another group, with the in- 
tent to have her give birth to a child who 
will consequently not belong to its moth- 
er's The five acts enumerated 
above encompass forms of physical and 
biological genocide but not cultural 
genocide, intentionally omitted by the 
drafters of the Genocide Convention in 
1948.39 Efforts to enlarge the definition 
of the crime of Genocide to extend to 
linguistic groups and to political, eco- 
nomic and social groups in the Rome 
Statute did not meet with success. 
1.2 Crimes Against Humanity - in 
International and Non- 
International Conflicts 
In Article 7 of the Rome Statute, crimes 
against humanity include acts such as 
murder, enslavement, forcible transfer 
of population, imprisonment in viola- 
tion of fundamental rules of interna- 
tional law, torture, persecution against 
any identifiable group on political, ra- 
cial, cultural and other grounds, the 
crime of Apartheid, and other inhu- 
mane acts of a similar character, where 
they are knowingly committed as part of 
a systematic or widespread attack 
against a civilian population. These 
crimes have been elaborated by several 
treaties and tribunals. These include the 
Hague40 and Geneva Conventions on 
humanitarian law in time of war.41 
Since the Second World War, there has 
been a consistency in the definition of 
Crimes against Humanity in interna- 
tional treaties such as the 1968 Conven- 
tion on the Non-Applicability of 
Statutory Limitations for War Crimes 
and Crimes against H~manity)~ and in 
the statutes of international tribunals 
such as the Statute of the International 
Military Tribunal at N~remberg)~ the 
International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East,44 the Tribunal for the Former 
Y u g ~ s l a v i a ~ ~  and the Tribunal for 
Rwanda.46 
The Rome Statute states the criteria of 
"widespread or systematic" as a keyre- 
quirement for attacks directed against 
any civilian population to be consid- 
ered a crime against humanity. "Wide- 
spread" is a term that refers to "the 
number of  victim^"?^ It refers to actions 
carried out collectively and on a large 
scale. The term "systematic" excludes 
random acts of ~iolence."~~ The "civil- 
ian" population includes all persons 
who have not taken any active part in 
hostilities, or are no longer doing ~ 0 . 4 ~  
Of particular significance is the inclu- 
sion of gender-related crimes that are 
defined under l(g) as "rape, sexualslav- 
ery, enforced prostitution, forced preg- 
nancy, enforced sterilization or any 
other form of sexual violence of compa- 
rable gravity". For the first time an inter- 
national treaty recognizes the crime of 
persecution against any identifiable 
group or collectivity on grounds of gen- 
der.50 Lastly, a critical affirmation is 
that crimes against humanity could oc- 
cur both in times of peace and in situa- 
tions of armed conflict. 
1.3 War Crimes - Raising the 
Threshold 
Article 8 of the Rome Statute provides an 
exhaustive list of war crimes provi- 
sions. Many States including the United 
States and France expressed concerns 
with these provisions and advocated 
high thresholds. War Crimes are pun- 
ishable as individual acts, do not re- 
quire any special intent element and do 
not normally need to be widespread or 
systematic. However, the Rome Statute 
in Article 8 (1) expressly states that the 
Court shall have jurisdiction in respect 
to war crimes, in particular, when com- 
mitted as part of a plan or policy, or as 
part of a large-scale commission of such 
crimes. 
War Crimes include thirty-four 
crimes relating to international con- 
flicts and, sixteencrimes relating tonon- 
international conflicts. The Rome 
Statute essentially codifies the Hague 
Conventions and the 'gravebreaches' of 
the four Geneva Conventions as well as 
itsAdditiona1 Protocols. The Rome Stat- 
ute codifies a list of gender related 
crimes similar to those listed as crimes 
against humanity. 
Another subject of contention relates 
to the issue of child soldiers. Globally it 
is estimated that there are over 300,000 
child soldiers.51 At the insistence of the 
US delegation, the compromise lan- 
guage adopted is not recruitment but 
"conscripting or enlisting children un- 
der the age of fifteen years into the na- 
tional armed forces or using them to 
participate actively in h~st i l i t ies ."~~ 
The most difficult provision to resolve 
related to the prohibition of nuclear 
weapons and landmines. There was 
strong opposition from the major mili- 
tary powers and the largest exporters of 
such weapons; namely China, Russia 
and, in particular, the United States. The 
Rome Statute prohibits the use of as- 
phyxiating, poisonous or other gases, 
and all analogous liquids, materials or 
devices53 and bullets that expand or 
flatten easily in the human body.54 
Reference to landmines, chemical and 
nuclear weapons are absent from the 
Rome Statute. 
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1.4 The Crime of Aggression: 
Ambiguity, Disagreement and 
Postponement 
This crime will only come under the ju- 
risdiction of thecourt once state parties 
amend the Rome Statute so as to provide 
for a definition of this currently ambigu- 
ous crime. The negotiators could not 
reach agreement over this issue, prima- 
rily due to the insistence of the perma- 
nent members of the Security Council 
that the Council play a significant role 
in ascertaining when aggression has 
occurred. 
2. Engendering the Rome Statute 
- Inclusion of Gender Concerns 
Gender-based violence has tradition- 
ally notbeen addressed in international 
humanitarian law. Rape was first men- 
tioned as a Crime against Humanity in 
Control Council Law No 10, produced 
by the Allied powers occupying Ger- 
m a n ~ ? ~  There were no prosecutions of 
rape in trials conducted on the basis of 
this instrument for a long time. The In- 
temationalMilitary Tribunal for the Far 
East found that approximately 20,000 
cases of rape occurred with the city of 
Nanking during the first month of occu- 
pation. Sadly, there were no prosecu- 
tions. Despite the rhetoric of States on 
their commitment to ensure the full en- 
joyment by women of all human rights, 
violations of the human rights of women 
have traditionally been neglected. 
These violations are ignored and often 
times dismissed as a "natural conse- 
quence" of war. 
This attitude has begun to change 
with work of the Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Arti- 
cle 5 para. (g) of the Statute of the ICTY 
and article 3para. (g) of the Statute of the 
ICTRexpressly include rape as a crime 
against humanity. At the Rome Confer- 
ence, a concerted advocacy campaign 
was spearheaded by the Women's Cau- 
cus onGender Justice to include specific 
provisions on gender specific crimes. It 
met with wide support from most non- 
governmental organizations and some 
States. Gender related crimes apply to 
international and non-international 
conflicts and are explicitly listed inboth 
Crimes against Humanity and War 
Crimes.56 The Rome Statute is the first 
international treaty recognizing the 
crime of forced pregnancy. Under 
Crimes against Humanity it includes 
the crime of persecution against any 
identifiable group or collectivity on 
grounds of gender.57 In addition to the 
crimes of enforced prostitution and en- 
slavement, the crime of sexual slavery is 
codified, thus recognizing that the co- 
erced nature of sexual services goes well 
beyond the crime of slavery. Finally, 
Article 21 (3) states that "the applica- 
tion and interpretation of law must be . . . 
without any adverse distinction 
founded on grounds such as gender, 
age, race, colour, language, religion or 
belief, political or other opinion, na- 
tional, ethnic or social origin, wealth, 
birth or other status". 
The Holy Sea and Ireland, backed by 
some African and Latin American 
States and a significant number of States 
in the Arab Leag~e?~  mounted a con- 
certed attackon the inclusionof "forced 
pregnancy" and the term "gender". 
They were joined by pro-life activists, 
mainly from North America, who 
mounted an aggressive campaign. 
Their efforts partially failed as these 
terms were retained. However in an ef- 
fort to deal with the controversy, the 
Rome Statute contains a provision 
which reads "the term 'gender' refers to 
both sexes, male and female, within the 
context of ~ociety"?~ 
On an institutional level, the Rome 
Statute provides for criteria in the selec- 
tion of judges taking into account a " fair 
representation of female and male 
judges."60 It also stipulates the need to 
include judged1 and advisers ap- 
pointedby the Prosecutor who have le- 
gal expertise on specific issues such as 
violence against women and chil- 
dren.62 The Registrar is to set up a Vic- 
tim and Witness Unit to provide, in 
consultation with the Office of the 
Prosecutor, protective measures and 
counselling services. The Unit is to in- 
clude staff with expertise in trauma, 
including trauma related to crimes of 
sexual vi0lence.6~ 
3. Jurisdiction of the Court 
The Rome Statute establishes that the 
jurisdiction of the Court applies to any 
natural persona over 18 years of age65 
who commits a crime within the juris- 
diction of the Court, irrespective of offi- 
cial capacity.66 The jurisdiction of the 
Court is non -retroactive67 and applies 
only to crimes committed once the Rome 
Statute comes into force and the Court is 
established. Among the international 
community, calls have been made to 
hold criminally responsible the authors 
of crimes committed in Cambodia, 
Burundi, Congo (Zaire), and Algeria. 
These will require ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals to be established. 
Further, the Rome Statute sets impor- 
tant preconditions to the exercise of ju- 
risdictionby the Court. The State on the 
territory of which the conduct in ques- 
tion occurred (territorial state) or the 
State of which the person accused of the 
crime is a national (state of nationality 
of the accused) should be party to the 
Rome S t a t ~ t e . ~ ~  A state not party to the 
Treaty may choose to file an ad-hoc dec- 
laration consenting to the Court's ju- 
risdiction over a specific crime in 
question.69 The criteria for determining 
jurisdiction does not take into account 
the identity of the state that has custody 
of the accused or the state of the victim. 
Further still, taking into considera- 
tion the concern of France, an important 
exception is made to the jurisdiction of 
the Court, which, in the view of many, is 
contrary to international law and prac- 
tice. A transitional provision in Article 
124 allowsastate Party to opt out of the 
jurisdiction of the Court over War 
Crimes committed on its territory orby 
its nationals for a period of seven years 
after the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute. 
This state consent regime is viewed 
by many international law experts and 
human rights defenders as both limit- 
ing and cumbersome. On the issue of the 
selection process of cases, the Interna- 
tional NGOCoalitionin Rome joined by 
many like-minded States advocated 
strongly that if the decision to trigger the 
Court was left to States Parties and the 
Security Council, it would compromise 
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the Court's impartiality and integrity. 
First, the perception of undue political 
influence in the initiation of the pro- 
ceedings may arise. Second, the experi- 
ence of other international treaties that 
envisage a state complaint procedure 
has so far proved that these mechanisms 
are not effective as diplomatic concerns 
and economic interests most often take 
pre~edence.~~ Third, Security Council 
actions are hampered by the 'veto' 
power of the permanent members of the 
Security Council. In addition, its man- 
date under Chapter W of theUNChar- 
ter71 - to maintain and restore 
international peace and security - 
would create ariskthat the Court would 
prosecute for politically expedient rea- 
sons. It was recognized, however, that 
referral of acase by the Security Council 
has the singular characteristic that it is 
binding on all UN member States, 
whether or not the States are parties to 
the Rome Statute. In spite of a conten- 
tious debate on the role and powers of 
the Security Council, which risked jeop- 
ardizing the consensus arrived at on 
other points during the Rome Confer- 
ence, the negotiators managed to ensure 
co-operation and avoid subordination 
of the Court to the Security Council. The 
resulting compromise is that in order to 
suspend or delay an investigation or 
prosecution, the Security Council must 
adopt a resolution to that effect. The 
resolution operates a one-year suspen- 
sion, but canbe renewed by a new reso- 
l ~ t i o n . ~  However, as a positive vote is 
required, eight members of the Security 
Council have to vote in favour of such a 
resolution and none of the Permanent 
members must vote against. Action by 
the Court can be triggered in one of three 
ways: as a referral by a State party, as a 
referral by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII powers of theunited 
Nations Charter and by the Prosecutor 
propio motu. 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute repre- 
sents a positive step in the struggle for 
international justice. It provides the 
Prosecutor the power to determine 
whether the case justifies an investiga- 
tion, based on information from any re- 
liable source. This provides an 
opportunity for individuals, victims 
and friends of the Court including 
NGOs, to bring violations to the atten- 
tion of the Court. The Prosecutor is re- 
quired to consult the Statebefore taking 
"non-compulsory measures" such as 
interviewing voluntary witnesses. Be- 
fore launching an investigation, the 
Prosecutor must request authorization 
to investigate from the Pre-TrialCham- 
ber, a judicial body of the Court. The 
mechanism set up thus allows States to 
participate in investigations but pre- 
cludes them fromhindering the judicial 
process. 
4. Complementarity: Working in 
Concert with National Courts 
and States Parties 
The Rome Statute seeks to balance the 
concerns of States who believe that na- 
tional courts have primary criminal law 
jurisdiction and the need for justice 
where domestic courts are unwilling or 
unable to proceed. Interestingly, in or- 
der to determine a state's unwillingness 
in a specific case, the Court will assess 
whether the actions of the state demon- 
strate an attempt to shield aperson from 
criminal responsibility, whether there 
has been any delay in the national pro- 
ceedings inconsistent with an intent to 
bring the alleged criminal to justice, and 
whether the proceedings are being con- 
ducted independently or impartially." 
To determine a state's inability, the 
Court will consider, having regard to 
the principles of due process recognized 
by international law, whether the state 
is unable to take the accused into cus- 
tody, to gather the necessary evidence 
and testimony and to carry out the pro- 
c e e d i n g ~ . ~ ~  These decisions may be 
subject to a review on appeal. At the 
present time, judicial systems in many 
countries are discredited for their lackof 
autonomy from the Executive branch of 
government or a lack of separation of 
powers from otherbranches of govern- 
ment. This is compounded in many de- 
veloping countries by procedural and 
structural deficiencies such as scarce 
resources, excessively formal proce- 
dures, heavy caseload and inability of a 
majority of citizens to access the courts. 
The principle of complementarity, 
supported by all States at the Confer- 
ence, insures that the Court will respect 
the state's sovereign right to investigate 
or prosecute a case over which it has 
jurisdiction. Article 17 envisages that a 
case could be challenged not only where 
the State itself is investigating or pros- 
ecuting or has prosecuted but also 
where a state has decidednot to proceed 
with a prosecution, unless the decision 
was due to the inability or unwilling- 
ness of the State. 
Upon ratification, the Treaty be- 
comes part of the national law of the 
State that ratifies it. The Court is to be- 
come an extension of national jurisdic- 
tion, relying upon the cooperation of 
States parties to carry out its functions 
and to enforce its order. To mention 
some examples, this cooperation may 
include, among other matters, the arrest 
and surrender of a person, collection of 
evidence, protection of victims and wit- 
nesses and seizure of the proceeds of 
crimes. The Court may also make re- 
quests for cooperation from non-state 
parties. The Court does not itself have 
the power to order state compliance. In 
situations where a state party refuses to 
cooperate, the Court could make afind- 
ing to that effect, and refer the matter to 
the Assembly of States parties or, in 
some cases, to the Security Council. The 
Assembly of States parties provides the 
management oversight75 to the Court 
and nominates its judges, ensuring that 
each has a role in the operation of the 
Court. 
The Rome Statute is a product of 
many a compromise. The adoption of 
the Rome Statute and the breadth of 
support reflected in the results of the 
vote demonstrates that there is, in the 
internationalcommunity today, agrow- 
ing consensus in favour of an institu- 
tional instrument for human rights. 
Part I11 - The Next Steps - 
Towards the Enforcement of 
International Human Rights 
Neither the NGOs nor individual States 
claim to be fully satisfied with the end 
product - the Rome Statute. Yet with 
some distance and closer review and 
reflection many agree that on balance it 
is a good statute, thebest we couldpos- 
sibly get at this time. The Rome Statute 
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marks a step forward for the civil soci- 
ety's goals without precluding further 
campaigns. As an indication, the most 
significant deficiency - the limitations 
on the jurisdiction of the Court - can be 
progressively overcome by efforts to 
universally ratify the Rome Statute. 
Three primary challenges remain to 
be addressed. Firstly, the work of the 
Preparatory Commi~sion?~ particu- 
larly relating to rules of procedure and 
evidence and the elements of crime. Sec- 
ondly, the financing of the Court. Lastly, 
the urgent need for ratification of the 
Rome Statute by at least 60 States. 
1. Work of the Preparatory 
Commission 
From the start of the proceedings, there 
was general agreement that the subject 
matter of deliberations and proposals 
shouldnot deviate from the Rome Stat- 
ute. Elements of Crime refer to the ele- 
ments of acts that mustbe provenby the 
Prosecutor in order to establish culpa- 
bility for a crime. One of themajor issues 
included the level of intent for culpabil- 
ity. The US proposed raising the level of 
intent to commit genocide to require 
awareness of a wider policy of genocide 
and action in furtherance of this wider 
p o l i ~ y . ~  A compromise was reached in 
informal discussion raising the intent 
requirement to include the extra - and 
easier to prove - objective element that 
"the accused knew or should have 
known". 
With regard to rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, some of the contentious issues 
had do to with the French proposals to 
set elaborate rules that seem to infringe 
on the independence of the Prosecutor. 
However, they are gearing up to make a 
very valuable contribution in highlight- 
ing the role of victims. The work of the 
Commission, to be completed by June 
2000, will assist tremendously the proc- 
ess of ratification by States of the Rome 
Statute by reducing the level of uncer- 
tainty about the operation of the Court. 
However, it highlights theneed for vigi- 
lance on the part of States and civil so- 
ciety toprevent the development of rules 
that undermine the progress achieved 
in Rome. 
2. Financing 
The financing of the Court is a crucial 
question which relates to the potential 
effectiveness, independence and influ- 
ence of the Court. A lack of funds for the 
establishment and operations of the 
Court could lead to politically biased or 
expedient choices and a reduction in 
the quality of its operations. States were 
split between two choices for financing 
the Court: funding by States Parties to 
the Treaty and funding out of the United 
Nations general budget. Some States 
argued that the regularbudget of the UN 
is a more reliable source of funding, 
would add to the universal character of 
the Court and encourage poorer States, 
otherwise shy of the costs of the Court, 
to support its creation. 
The United States argued that the 
Court would be aheavy drain on the UN 
budget and that the Court would have to 
compete for resources among the 
myriad of UN priorities. The Rome Stat- 
ute stipulates that the expenses of the 
Court and the Assembly of State Parties 
shallbe provided both by contributions 
made by state parties and funds pro- 
vided by the United Nations, the latter, 
in particular, for expenses incurred by 
Security Council  referral^".^^ In addi- 
tion, the Court will accept voluntary 
contributions. 
Learning from the experience of the 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda is crucial. Creative ways will 
have to be found to avoid unjustified 
delays and to ensure efficiency and 
transparency in the management of per- 
sonneland procurement. The amount of 
political, and thereby financial, support 
will depend innear term on the number 
of States Parties to the Court and the 
quality of its judgements once it begins 
operations. 
3. Ratification of the Rome Statute 
Presently, 82 States have become signa- 
tories to the Rome Statute. Senegal be- 
came the first state to ratify the Rome 
Statute, followed by Trinidad and To- 
bago and San mar in^.^^ Belgium, Lux- 
embourg, Italy and France have 
commenced the ratification process. 
The record of ratification for many of the 
treaties that relate to the subject matter of 
the Court is positive. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political 
RightsSo took ten years to come into force 
and has 140 ratifications. Its Optional 
Protocol (which includes international 
oversight mechanism^)^^ also took ten 
years and has 93 ratifications. The 
Genocide Conventi~n~~ took three years 
and has 124 ratifications. 
The earlyratificationbystates of this 
treaty is crucial so as to maximize on the 
momentum generated in Rome and the 
recent decision on the Pinochet case by 
the Law Lords in Great Britaina3 An 
effective strategy for civil society to en- 
courage ratification should focus on: 
first, ensuring progress in the work of 
the Preparatory Commission so as to 
encourage States to design enabling leg- 
islation domestically; second, promot- 
ing public awareness on the Rome 
Statute. Third, encouraging key sup- 
porter States to lead the way in ratifica- 
tion. Fourth, States, international 
agencies and NGOs should continue 
concerted efforts to provide technical 
and legal assistance to States to change 
domestic legislation to comply the Rome 
Statute. Fifth, using available up-com- 
ing international events and forums, 
such as the Summit of the Americas, to 
keep the issue of ratification on the 
agenda, formally and informally. 
In States with amnesty laws in place, 
as is the case in the Americas, it is irnpor- 
tant to emphasize the Court's comple- 
mentarity with national courts and the 
non-retroactivity of its jurisdiction. 
There is a need to appreciate the con- 
cerns of States who voted against the 
Statute and every effort should bemade 
to continue the dialogue with them. 
However, any attempt to reopen the 
Rome Statute and dilute its contents or 
attempts to exploit loopholes so as to 
undermine the Court should be vigor- 
ously opposed and publicly exposed. It 
has been alleged that the United States 
is making such an attempt by approach- 
ingstates supportive of thecourt, such 
as South Africa and Poland, and sign- 
ing agreements whereby these States 
promise not to give up any US citizens to 
the This is consistent with Ar- 
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ticle 98 of the Rome Statute, which pre-
cludes the Court from making a request 
for surrender or assistance that would 
require a state to act inconsisten t1 y with 
its obligations under international law to 
a third party, unless the consent of the 
third party is given.  
Conclusion  
The adoption of the Rome Statute on July 
17th 1998 marks a watershed in the 
struggle to end the impunity enjoyed by 
perpetrators of egregious crimes. There 
were seven major welcome outcomes of 
the Rome Conference which had been 
advocated by civil society organizations, 
namely: 1) the provision for an 
Independent Prosecutor; 2) the inclusion 
of crimes committed during non-
international armed conflict; 3) the 
recognition of gender related crimes, 
such as forced pregnancy and sexual 
slavery; 4) the creation of a Victim and 
Witness Protection Unit; 5) the exclusion 
of the death penalty; 6) the refusal to 
permit reservations to the Rome Statute; 
and 7) the diversity of funding sources 
for the Court.  
Many compromises were made in 
Rome in order to get a large number of 
States to support the adoption of the 
Treaty. Foremost on the list are: 1) the 
limitation on the Court's jurisdiction 
where investigation is not triggered by 
the Security Council; 2) the non- inclu-
sion of nuclear weapons and landmines 
in the list of prohibitive weapons; and 3) 
the inclusion of the seven year opt-out 
provision on war crimes.  
As Cherif Bassiouni said, "The ICC 
will not be a panacea for all the ills of 
humankind. But it can help avoid some 
conflicts, prevent some victimization and 
bring tojustice some of the perpetrators 
of these crimes. In so doing, the ICC will 
strengthen world order and contribute to 
world peace and security."8s To secure 
an effective Court, it is essential that 
States display courage, tenacity and 
strong political will and proceed with 
ratification of the Rome Statute. Civil 
society organizations including non-
governmental organizations, women's 
rights groups, academics, journalists, 
church groups and legal experts have a 
major role to play in edu-  
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cating fellow citizens and encouraging 
States to ratify the Rome Statute. 
Making the International Criminal Court 
a reality, a universal instrument for 
retributive and restorative justice in a 
fractured world, will be a modest, yet 
worthwhile step forward for the whole of 
humankind. II  
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